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Early Naval Tactics

And New Manoeuvres

This Naval History continues on from: "Horatio Nelson"

First the great gun killed the Old Naval Warfare, and then it killed the galley, slowly but surely. For the Old Warship was not a suitable carrier of the great gun, and could not be made into one.

It had neither the strength nor the stability nor the design to allow of a row of peices firing at right angles to its length; its end came simply because it could not house a "broadside."

The whole frame was too slight to take the cross-ship recoil of the great gun, and its sides, in which the broadside ports would have to be cut, were already spoken for by the oars. It could, and somethimes did, mount one big gun, with a little array of smaller ones on each side.

The big gun could only be placed to fire foreward. When installed it was situated on the forward fighting platform, immediately over the keel, and the force of its recoil was backwards, along the line of the keel. It would just take the strain of that and sometimes, another big gun facing aft also recoiled along over the keel.

But that only made two big guns at best, where quite a small broadside ship could carry at least a dozen. Drakes famous "Golden Hind" in 1577, though not more than 150 tons burden, mounted at least seven big guns on each side and four in the bows; 18 peices in all. Some historians claim Drake had 30 peices, but that seems hardly possible in a ship of that size?

It took a long time for the big gun to establish itself as the recognized battle winner, which spared the galleys life for a while. But the day would eventually dawn when the actions of battle would be decided by guns alone.

Nothing like a decisive test of strength between rivals occured until Elizabeth and Phillip came to blows.

Horatio Nelson

The King's Beard was only Singed

When, in 1587, Francis Drake sailed boldly into the sheltered harbour of Cadiz, intent on "singeing the King of Spain's beard," the issue was quickly decided. A dozen or so galleys rowed to the attack, operating under ideal conditions for them, and supposedly poor ones for Drake, since the breeze was very light and the water too landlocked to manoeuvre.

Drake confidently stood his ground and met them with gunfire. One or two "broadsides" revealed a lot of damage for all to see, that the galley was no match, for the new big ship of the north, with its mighty weapon the Great Gun.

Phillip of Spain learnt his lesson well. When his great Armada sighted England in the following year, there was not a single galley in his fleet; which he was anticipating would triumph. However the King's real war-fleet was still composed almost exclusively of galleys.

The galley lingered on in the Mediterranean, sometimes fighting its own kind. It even appeared as late as 1704, when several squadrons joined in an unsuccessful attempt to wrest back Gibraltar, from its captor, Sir George Rooke. But the galley's day was done, the long oared ship gradually faded into oblivion.

But the Great Gun killed more than the galley. It killed galley warfare too and the whole concept of "Naval Tactics" which for 2000 years had been the only known sea tactics.

The way in which the rowed ship had always fought closely resembled the tactics of infantry fighting on the open plain. No soldiers advanced to attack in a sigle or double file, or even fours. They would march like that; halt; reform and deploy, ready for a full frontal attack.

New manoeuvres was a necessary requirement

To approach in what in naval language is known as "line ahead" would have invited the galley to destruction. So to limit this, they always advanced in "line abreast," either in "close order" or "open order."

Because that way their fire-power is increased, to give the enemy as big a blast as possible, and all previous weapons were most effective when used in the direction in which the bearer is moving.

If we transfer what we see in the field, to water, we see that the galley in sea-warfare was doing exactly what the infantryman was doing on land. It was advancing on its foe with its weapon in front; "the ram." The whole squadron of galleys would advance side by side in line abreast, and tried to deliver its blows altogether.

The galley like the soldier had its vulnerable points; its two flanks. To counter that and gain maximum defence they tried to keep "close order." The equivalent to that on land, to prevent being attacked on the flank.

The arrival of the Great Gun in the sailing ship, and the concentration of its fire in a broadside, completely changed all the galley naval tactics.

Becuase for the first time the attacking weapon of the broadside was fired at right angles. This was new in naval warfare so an entirely new set of tactics were required for entering into battle.

The Great Gun Created Sailing-Ship Warfare

Before it came in the Round-Ship fights of northern seas, involved the frontal "approach" of the attacking sailing fleet, which was recognised as the true naval-tactic. But once that phase was over, the attackers then entered into a sort of melee.

Physical contact meant that all tactics ceased to be naval or anything else when the hand-to-hand fighting ensued. But now for the first time new "off-fighting" had arrived.

Because the Great Gun was a ship-killer at a range, it was possible that no combatant on either side would be able to grapple another ship, or be able to clamber, from one ship to another, and there might not be any hand-to-hand fighting at all.

Eventually new sailing-ship tactics would have to evolve to include the sea-fight as well. Such a thing was new; nothing like this had ever happened on land. Rival armies might bombard each other's defensive positions for a while, but in the end they closed, and the man-at-arms came into his own with his cold steel.

And this is true of land-fighting today, modern air-power cannot win the final victory on land without the infantryman with a gun and bayonet. No war is won without the combatant entering into a duel, and overpowering the enemy.

Gun-powder could win the day

And for several centuries often did, win final victory at sea. The problem was; how to draw up a fleet of broadside ships to hit the enemy hardest. To do that the old line-abreast of the galley had to be discarded; and was. The sailing ship's line-ahead was the basis for their new naval-tactics.

This caused a host of problems for the attacking fleet, if it were to aim at the enemy, which was proceeding in a parralell direction, and not directly towards him. If he was prepared to fight he will range himself on a paralell line ahead and engage in the same way. But if he wants to avoid action then it would be a lot easier for him to do so.

In all sailing-ship open-battles of the Great Gun era the proportion of indecisive action was high; much higher than in the galley days. The problem of bringing an unwilling foe into close action was always a difficult one, and it only began to get solved towards the end of the wooden sailing-ship age.

Wind gave the initiative

The windward fleet almost always dictated the time and the place of the fight; an overriding advantage to have. The British Navy with its offensive strategy always strived to procure the wind advantage.

In theory possession of the wind gave the better chance of massing on the enemy's force. The windward fleet gained one major advantage in the matter of visibility.

The smoke from its guns drifted down from it on to the leeward fleet, while the latters swirled around upon itself. This was a very considerable factor in the days of really close fighting, and of the early black powder which created clouds of smoke everytime the gun was fired.

Advantage of leeward

The French were notorious for this station, it best suited their less effective strategy, where they could keep open their line of retreat, and not risk all in a fight that they did not desire. If by chance they had the wind, they used its advantage to avoid action all together.

The leeward fleet profited as the windward fleet suffered from considerable damage brought upon the latter in the "bearing down". By the time that battle was fully joined, the mobility of the leeward fleet was usually far less affected than that of the windward, which was a tremendous advantage to the man who seeks but half a battle.

There was often one great gunnery advantage for the leeward fleet. If the wind was strong and the seas were high, the ships on either side, were naturally heeling over to leeward; and the lowest portholes of the windward fleet, housing their heaviest pieces, might be so near to the water as to make it too dangerous to open them.

But the corresponding ports of the leeward fleet would be correspondingly elevated, so that the guns within could safely be used. This phyisical factor is sometimes overlooked, but, whenever it operated, it was of prime importance.

Sailing-Ship Tactical Skills

Sailing-ship tactics were a completely new art, bearing no relation to the old "naval-tactics," and they had to be developed from scratch.

They were developed almost exclusively by the English, who were certainly the first, by a good many years, to use the manoeuvre Line Ahead as their basic fighting formation. But it was a very slow business.

Though it seems clear enough, now, that the broadside must logically lead to line ahead. For one thing, guns of ship-killing size were introduced rather sparingly at first. And then they had to establish their claim to be effective, as against other and older proven weapons.

Then again, all those charged with making tactical plans thought in terms of galley tactics, of "line-abreast" If they read books on "naval tactics," there were far too many to read, and all would be dealing with galley warfare and galley tactics.

Modern-day Pages Fast Boats Pages Joe Wezley Pages

Only Old Naval Tactical Books

All the written works were dealing formally and systematically with the old naval tactics; none had been written about the new manoeuvres yet. They all advocated a purely "galley" system, stating quite definitely that each squadron of sailing ships "ought to sail in line abreast."

The Spanish were well behind England in the number and power of the guns they carried. Lord Lisle, commanding Henry VIII's new fleet in 1545, ordered the ships under his command into three squadrons, one behind the other and all in line abreast! Yet it was probably at least thirty years since the first big guns appeared on board ship.

Lord Lisle was quite medieval in his concepts of a naval fight. Evidently making his dispositions on the assumption that the weight of the gun-fire, will be directed forward and not sideways. Clearly he had no understanding of the weapon, or what it was capable of doing.

It is true he recommended gaining the weather advantage, but for a soldier's rather than for a sailor's reason. The sailor came to want it in order to retain a maximum freedom of movement and the initiative in attack. But the soldier wants the freedom from smoke, a sound enough reason but not a naval one.

The continuation of this Naval History will be: " "

Early Naval Tactics

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