Edward Hughes

Fighting In Indian Waters 1782/3

This Naval History continues on from: "Indian Wars"

Admiral Sir Edward Hughes was also, a good and efficient officer. He was certainly an exceptionally fine seaman, and we have evidence of his rival, who was something of a genius, that his tactical handling of his fleet was, magnificent.

But again those limits existed, and they may be best discribed here in the sense of the word, he too was "docile". He would not-or could not-rise superior to the System and succeed in spite of it.

There is of course much to be said in his favour. He was fighting in the same far-distant theatre as Pocock and Peyton, and any serious set-back to the fleet under his command would have sent the whole set-up of Britain in India crumbling.

Edward Hughes was facing a naval force which was, on paper as strong as his own, and at first stronger. Above all, in Vice- Admiral Bailli de Suffren he had an opponent of a calibre such as Rooke, Hawke, Nelson or Napoleon.

He was almost the sole French commander of the century, whose strategic concepts were cast on such offensive lines as were to be found only in the flagships of his enemy, and with such enterprising tactical ideas as left those enemies far behind.

Indian wars

They Fought Five Battles

The tactical details of the five duals fought between these two opponents are of the utmost interest, but here we must merely consider two aspects of them-the "Docility" of the British commander, and the revealing spectacle of what happened in a "formal" battle when the leeward fleet, instead of avoiding action, held its ground.

The first battle was off Sadras on 17th April 1982, there were twelve French against nine English ships; off the north coast of Ceylon on the 12th April 1782, 12 French against eleven English ships; off Cuddalore on 6th July 1782, eleven French against eleven English ships; of Negapatam on 3rd September 1782, fourteen French against 12 English ships, and again off Cuddalore on 20th June 1783, fifteen French against eighteen English ships.

Letter To First Lord Of Admiralty

An idea of what Sir Edward's tactical character was likely to be, is contained in a sentence of the letter written by Sir Hugh Pallister to Lord Sandwich, the First Lord, recommending Hughes for the East Indian Command.

"One thing which I think an essential quality your Lordship will be sure to find in him, that is, that he will not wander out of the path that may be prescribed to him, to follow any shemes and whims of his own, nor never will study to find fault in orders, but always how he may best execute them for His Majestey's service".

It turned out to be a most just summary of Hughes's character, and it contained, a most exact forecast of what the man would do in action. Within the limits of the System, Sir Edward was all that could be desired in a leader.

He Would Adhere To The Permanent Instructions

In the first two battles Suffren attacked, with the wind and with really aggressive tactics, which included schemes to consentrate on the rear of the enemy and using his extra ships to surround the rearmost of the British fleet.

He failed, largely through the failure of his captains to change their methods of a lifetime and act offensively, partly through the high standard of technical efficiency in the British ships; but hardly at all through the tactical action of Hughes, who maintained a correct and rigid line throughout.

In The Third Action

This time Hughes had his first and last opportunity to attack with the wind. His conduct of the battle was strictly according to the rule. And, as ever on such occasions, his fleet failed to come in together to deliver the "shock".

There was hard fighting, and de Suffren being much less prone to yeild ground than most Frenchmen, it began to look as though the British might at last achieve decisive results from the system.

But then the wind shifted, and later died. Hughes was probably robbed of victory; but only possibly, for there was no reason why, had the wind held, Suffren would not have broken off the action in the usual french way.

In Their Fourth Battle

In the opening phases in this battle Sir Edward's Handling was superb. Rather badly outnumbered, he retreated in masterly style, forcing suffren in the end to attack in somewhat ragged order.

He even succeeded in isolating the centre of the French fleet, battering and dismasting their flagship; and all this without once deviating from the full, equally spaced line.

It has seemed to some historians that he now had the enemy at his mercy, and had he departed from the System, he might have destroyed the French centre.

This may be true , though it is only fair to add that, owing to the lightness of the wind, it is possible he could not do these things. This much is certain; he did not do it, and he did not try. He "kept the line."

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Their last Battle

Bailli de Suffren triumphed; physically and morally, but strangely not tactically. He had planned to attack very similar to Tourville's at Barfleur; to concentrate his heavy ships on the rear of the English line and to contain the rest.

But when the time came, with an inferior fleet he attacked the British in the British way; all sharing a common boundary. He had at last drilled his captains into a remarkable state of seamenlike excellence; and obedience.

But the British also attacked in the British way; they did not complete this surprising reversal of roles by acting in the French way. They stood their ground and fought it out.

When night fell they were still there, pounding one another. However with the night, came exhaustion of the human element on either side, and the fleets drifted apart in the darkness.

Two Days Later Hughes Sailed North

It was probably the belief of the French that he was "on the run," and his action has often been so presented by later writers. But it is not so.

He retired on the 22nd June 1783, but only after waiting throughout the 21st upon the field of battle for Suffren who did not appear. Suffren had been carried north by the off-shore current. The fact was that the opponents had lost each other.

One fine feather must be retained in Suffren's cap. He had attacked a superior British fleet and had inflicted upon it heavier losses than he received.

The lesson to be learnt from this battle was; given equal, or nearly equal fleets, the System was incapable of bringing victory even when both sides played to the same set of rules.

The lesson of the whole series of battles was; given a really good fleet (as Hughes's was) and a really able commander, within the limits of the line (as hughes unquestionably was), the results of the System would still remain tactically indecisive and completely unproductive.

In the course of five hard fought battles, not a single ship on either side was sunk or changed hands.

The continuation of this Naval History will be: "Thomas Mathews"

Edward Hughes Thomas Mathews

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