Edward Peyton

Indian Waters Tactics 1746

This Naval History continues on from: "Slave Triangle"

Commodore Edward Peyton found himself on 25th July 1746, towards the end of the first war; off Negapatam, in India and in the presence of a French fleet under La Bourdonnais, which was superior to his own in the number of ships, nine to six, guns and men, but inferior in power of both individual ships and guns.

He had the advantage of the wind, and his obvious strategic aim was to save the British possessions on the Indian mainland; at best by destroying the enemy's sea-force, but at least by maintaining British fleet upon the coast.

His strategic aim must be mentioned, even though it is not our main concern here, since upon it might well depend the nature of his tactics.

Slave Triangle

English Shock Tactics

The Commodore decided upon a strictly formal action. His "approach" was reasonably well managed, and with his heavier artillery he contrived to punish the two leading French ships between wind and water.

But he did not succeed in achieving that "shock" which was, in theory, the strength of the whole method; in practice, it seemed no commander ever did. For though he attempted to engage the main with the main and the rear with the rear, the enemy could easily frustate him and did so.

This factor was always present in encounters so conducted. It often seems, as though the framers of the "continuous line" theory had forgotten that the foe might have a different view on the subject.

French Tactics

The leading French ships, finding the English fire uncomfortably hot, simply wore round, thus increasing the already none-to-close range: and they were followed by the rest.

Meanwhile, whenever the rivals engaged, the French pursued their normal gun tactics of firing on the upward roll, and so of aiming at the English masts, yardarms and rigging, in order to decrease their mobility.

While the English pursued their all but universal practice of firing on the downward roll and hitting the enemy in the hull. The immediate result was that, when firing ceased, the motive power of the English was considerably more damaged than that of the French.

Failed Tactics

As was natural, at nightfall the action petered out. It was always the tragedy of this type of battle that the English had such good intentions, but produced such poor results. It all sounded logical enough.

Our strategic aim was offensive as it was simple; "go and wipe out the enemy; you will then enjoy unmolested sea-power." So the English went in, with gun tactics as offensive as they were simple; "aim at his hull: smash up his ships and his men: sink them or batter them to surrender!"

But the science of fleet tactics had come to a full stop just when men were saying "Look out! When fleets are anything like equal, or when the enemy is superior, any concentration of your force upon any part of his line will only lead to similar, or more formidable, concentration of his upon yours.

Instruction For Order Of Fighting

It is hard now; to assess the crippling effects of that damage inflicted by the French upon Peyton's mobility after the action had once begun.

But it is tempting to think that, had he decided, from the first approach, to mass upon either the centre or the rear of the enemy. His heavy guns might have inflicted decisive damage before the remaining French ships could come up.

The point can never now be answered for certain, because he did not do so. And he did not do so, not necessarily because it did not occur to him, nor because it was wrong to do the thing under the circumstances: but, because it was not catered for in the Instructions under which he had been ordered to fight his action.

Modern-day-Pages Fast Boats Pages Joe Wezley Pages

A Tactical Sense

Strategically Peyton had another chance a little later, and even reached a point of bearing down on the enemy. But, finding him considerably reinforced, he declined action altogether. Here again we need not necessary blame him.

It is even possible that he was justified in a tactical sense. but it is difficult to condone his next action; a purely strategic one. He sailed away altogether, leaving the coast to the enemy: and Madras our principal settlement fell to the enemy.

In this case it, is impossible to avoid feeling that the System, bad as it was, must not be made to shoulder all of the blame. Afterall Admiral John Byng was mercilessly executed, shot by firing squad for leaving Minorca to the fate of the enemy.

Edward Peyton was sent home under arrest and not employed again, but that was on account of his strategic mistake. No official comment was ever passed upon his tactical conduct.

The continuation of this Naval History will be: "Marines Afloat"

Edward Peyton Marines Afloat

"Pirates Trilogy" $20