Indian Wars
The Wars Of Southern India
This Naval History continues on from: "Marine Gunners"
Britain and France both had significant colonial possessions
in India and had been battling for supremacy for a number of
years. The British were represented by the British East India
Company who were permitted to raise troops.
The collapse of the long-standing Mughal Empire brought the
clash between the two states to a head, as each tried to gain
sufficient power and territory to dominate the other.
The 1754 Treaty of Pondicherry which ended the Second Southern
India War had brought a temporary truce to India, but it was
soon under threat again. A number of smaller Indian Princely
States aligned with either Britain or France to gain influence.
One of the most assertive of these Princes was the pro-French
Nawab of Bengal, Siraj ud-Daulah, who resented the British
presence in Calcutta, and was prepared to assist the French in
removing the British.
In 1756 he had succeeded his grandfather Alivardi Khan who
had been a staunch British ally. By contrast he regarded the
British East India Company as an encroaching threat on his
jurisdiction.
Marine Gunners
Land Battle Of Calcutta
On 20 June 1756 the Nawab's troops stormed Fort William and
captured the city. A number of the British civilians and
prisoners of war were locked in a small, dark, damp and dirty
guardroom in what became known as the Black Hole of Calcutta.
After the death of many of them, the atrocity became a popular
rallying call for revenge. A strong force from Madras under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive, arrived and
liberated the city, driving out the Nawab's troops.
The Third War of Southern India that followed saw Britain
ranged against the Nawab and France. Clive consolidated his
position in Calcutta, and made contact with one of the Nawab's
chief advisors Mir Jafar attempting to persuade him and other
leading Bengalis to overthrow the Nawab.
After the British ambushed a column of the Nawab's troops
which was approaching Calcutta on 2 February 1757, the two
sides agreed the Treaty of Alinagar which brought a temporary
truce to Bengal.
Land Battle of Plassey
Despite the agreement at Alinagar, neither side was content
with the status quo. The British felt that if they did not
assert their position, the French would become the dominant
power in Bengal.
Siraj ud-Daulah was fearful of being forced to accept British
sovereignty. His position was weakened by his unpopularity
with his own subjects, and the threat of other military
enemies to the west. He began to take steps to drive the
British out of Bengal entirely.
On 23rd June 1757 the Nawab led a force of 50,000 into the
field. Ranged against them was a much smaller Anglo-Indian
force under the command of Robert Clive.
The Nawab was weakened by the betrayal of Mir Jafar who had
concluded a secret pact with the British before the battle -
and refused to move his troops to support the Nawab.
Faced with the superior firepower and discipline of the
British troops – the Nawab's army was routed. After the brutal
battle, Siraj ud-Daulah was overthrown and executed by his own
officers, and Mir Jafar succeeded him as Nawab. He then
concluded a peace treaty with the British.
Mir Jafar himself subsequently clashed with the British for
much the same reasons as Siraj ud-Daulah had. He conspired
with the Dutch East India Company to try to oust the British
from Bengal. In 1759 he invited the Dutch to send troops to aid
him.
The defeat of the Dutch at the Battle of Chinsurah resulted
in Britain moving to have Jafar replaced with his son-in-law,
who was considered more favourable to the British East India
Company. One of the most important long-term effects of the
battle was that the British received the diwan – the right to
collect taxes in Bengal which was granted in 1765.
The French East India Company
The French presence in India was led by the French East India
Company operating out of its base at Pondicherry. Its forces
were under the command of Joseph François Dupleix and Lally,
a Jacobite. The veteran Dupleix had been in India a long time,
and had established a key rapport with France's Indian allies.
Lally was more newly arrived, and was seeking a swift victory
over the British - and was less concerned about diplomatic
sensibilities. This mistake would cost the French dearly.
Following the Battle of Chandalore when Clive attacked a
French trading post the French were driven completely out of
Bengal. In spite of this the French still had a major presence
in central India, and hoped to regain the power they had lost
to the British in southern India during the Second War.
The Years Of Misfortune 1759
Apart from a few isolated victories, the war had not gone
well for Britain since 1754 and in all theatres except India
and North America (where Pitt's strategy had led to important
gains in 1758) they were on the retreat.
British agents received information about a planned French
invasion which would knock Britain out of the war completely.
While France starved their colonial forces of troops and
supplies to concentrate them on the goal of gaining total
strategic supremacy in Europe. At Arromaches the French
prepared to invade England; but they had second thoughts and a change of mind.
The British government agreed to continue their policy of
shipping their own troops to fight for total victory in the
colonies—leaving Britain to be guarded by the large militia
that had existed since 1757.
Siege Of Madras And Battle Of Condore
Following Clive's victory at Plassey and the subjugation of
Bengal, Britain had not directed large resources to the
Indian theatre. The French meanwhile had despatched a large
force from Europe to seize the initiative on the subcontinent.
The clear goal of this force was to capture Madras, which had
previously fallen to the British in 1746. With the arrival of
fresh forces in December 1758 a French force of 8,000 under
the Comte de Lally descended on Madras, bottling up the 4,000
British defenders in Fort St George.
After a hard-fought three-month siege the French were finally
forced to abandon their attempt to take the city by the
arrival of a British naval force carrying 600 reinforcements
on 16 February 1759. Lally withdrew his troops, but it was not
the end of French ambitions in southern India.
Battle of Wandiwash and Siege of Pondicherry
The British capture of Pondicherry proved to be a decisive
moment in the long-term battle for control in India. After
this point French India was confined only to a handful of
trading posts stretched along the coast, while the British
moved into the interior extending their control. Eventually
the French departed entirely from the Indian mainland.
George Pocock In Indian Waters
Admiral George Pocock was a man of a different, and higher,
stamp, and there is little resemblance between him and Edward
Peyton. Either in general personal character or in success as
a naval officer; or in relative achievements.
For, in a situation not unlike that which Peyton found
himself, Pocock proved strategically successful where Peyton
failed altogether. Yet in one respect they were not unalike
in their attitude towards their Fighting Instructions. The
scene was much the same on the Coromandel coast of India.
During the Second of the Seven Years War the ultimate mastery
of the whole area depended upon the acquisition or maintaining
sea-power along the all-important coast.
Three dull actions which ended undicisively took place. The
first, off Fort St. David on 29th April 1758; at much the
same spot on 3rd August 1758; and off Pondicherry 10th
September 1759.
Each time Pocock had the wind advantage, and each time he
attacked in the approved manner. Each time heavy firing
developed in part of the line, the British, by reason of
their gun method, inflicted far heavier losses of men than
they themselves received.
The French, by reason of their run-away and fight another-day
tactics, leaving the British unable to achieve their offensive
intentions. Each time, when d'Ache, the French commander,
found that when he or his captains had had enough, he would
simply slip away.
Lose Effectiveness Or Intensity
On the first occasion, the French wore-away in succession,
whilst damaging Pocock's flagship in the process-and on the
second by wearing-away together "in a ragged line abreast".
On the third occasion the French stood their ground for a
longer time, and only departed one-by-one, as each ship's
commander felt he had had enough of the action.
Here we see a very good examle of the working of that famous
article 21, which forbade any ship to leave the line in
pursuit of any small number of enemy.
The Individual British Ships Had Done Well
Many of them had inflicted wounds, but only less than mortal
upon the hostile enemy. But now, as their foes dropped away,
they had the problem of not being allowed to follow them to
complete the work.
It was unsatisfactory both morally and materially. No ship,
on either side, was sunk or taken in any of the battles. The
one and only presumed advantage of the system proved to be
something of "hope-for," which was either illusory or
impossible to achieve.
Pocock, his captains and his men were good seamen, and it may
be assumed that they did their first turn from line ahead to
line abreast, and their second turn from line abreast to line
ahead well, if not better than usual.
Yet the "shock tactics" failed completely to materialize. The
trouble was always the same: the leading ships got ahead of
the others, and were turning into their final line ahead
positions some time before their comrades in the rear were
ready to do the same.
Modern-day Pages
Fast Boats Pages
Joe Wezley Pages
His Tactics Were Possibly Correct
It must be emphasized that Pocock was not necessarily wrong
in the tactics which he used. Were the results of the battles
illusory, he could well claim them to be right. For after the
third encounter.
It was a badly punished d'Ache, and not Pocock, who took a
leaf out of Peyton's book and withdrew his fleet entirely:
and in the end it was Pondicherry, not Madras, which fell
into the hands of whoever had control over the seas.
The point to look at is that Pocock, like Peyton, made no
tactical effort of any kind to get round the Permanent
Instructions, which they had to follow. That's why he must be
labelled here as-tactically-"docile".
The continuation of this Naval Hisory will be: "Edward Hughes"
Indian Wars
Edward Hughes
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