George Byng, John Byng's Father

This Naval History continues on from: "Prelude to War"

The first "chase" did not call for a remarkable degree of boldness or judgement because it was new, it had not been carried out before. But it was the first occasion on which "The Chase" was used as the main tactical feature of a battle, and it was a complete success.

In 1718, Sir George Byng commanded in the Mediterranean a fairly well-formed and well-gunned fleet of twenty-one ships of the line. Off Cape Passaro he came across a Spanish squadron, which was in no way his equal either in number of line ships or in force.

On seeing them he simply dispensed with the Line tactics altogether, and ordered a General Chase from the start. The enemy was not, it is true, "on-the-run" when he gave the signal, but they were moments later.

So he had no difficulty, and left himself, in little or no danger, in capturing or destroying practically the whole of the Spanish force.

After this John Norris drew up "Chasing Instructions"; in the orders there were certain chasing signals; these are now lost. But they were issued as the first official; "Additional Instruction."

Prelude to War

John Byng

The Admiral Shot By Firing Squad

One of the judges who sat in that sorry cabin where they broke poor Mathews was Captain John Byng. Though son of a famous father, he was not a great man himself, being by nature over-prone to take advice of others and to see the darker side of things: what the twenty-first century would have called a "defeatist."

But he was a naval commander of some natural ability and of very considerable experience; and he was, for that age, something of an enlightened tactician.

In 1756, very early in the Seven Years' War, he was sent with a small fleet, inadequately equipped and manned, into the Mediterranean, where Minorca was being besieged by the French.

Questions Of Fault Lie Here

He arrived off Port Mahon, the island's capital, to find it being besieged by a large number of French troops; he failed, somewhat tamely, to get in touch with the defenders, and, almost before he knew where he was, found himself, on 20th May, in the presence of the Marquis de la Galissoniere, the best French sailor of the day, in command of a fleet numerically equal, but in power somewhat superior to his own.

Byng's conduct of the opening moves was good. He raced Galissoniere for the south-westerly wind, and won it. Galissoniere gave up and made as though to pass to leeward of the English, nearly (but nit quite) in the opposite direction.

It was Byng's duty, were he one-hundred-per-cent "formal," to hold his course until his main force was exactly sharing a common boundary with the French rear, to tack, and then bear down on the enemy fleet.

As Per Tactical Rules

But he must have hinted, he was a man with ideas on the subject, and he did not do so. Instead he held on a little longer, until his leading ship was well past the rear Frenchman.

His idea was, after going about, to "go slanting" down upon the enemy: to approach in a line of bearing, that is, with his individual ships on the slant, neither in line abreast nor in line ahead, but half-way between the two.

This manoeuvre, if properly carried out, would have obvious advantage of partially evading that crippling line-abreast interlude when his ships would be "raked," and when his braodside guns could not be fired.

They could still play upon the enemy as the ships came down, albeit at a longer range than usual. Byng did not invent this idea. It occurs in some surviving instructions issued by Lord Dartmouth in 1688, supplementing the Duke of York's 1673 Instructions.

Some Approved of the Move

It was probably a really good move in itself: and the best proof of its soundness is the fact that Hawke, in the very same year, adopted it entirely. The point is, though not new, it was old enough not to be unfamilliar, and was liable to be misunderstood.

Ever since the fiasco off Toulon in 1744, the captains had tended to play for safety: even, when there was any doubt, to the verge of obeying orders of the tactical rules rather than the Admiral.

Three Major Set-Backs Now Ruined The Plan

First the British Fleet were not truly aligned for bearing down, even had the normal procedure been followed. For Byng's line at the moment of tacking should have been parallel with the French as they passed in the other direction. But it was not.

It was sailing south-south-east, while de la Galissoniere's was sailing west-north-west. This, of course, meant that, when the English bore down, the distance to be covered between their rear ships and the French main force was a good deal less than the distance between their main force and the enemy's rear.

So were everything to go otherwise like clockwork, the English rear must arrive in action before the English main force, and, once more, all semblance of "shock" would be lost. And the same fault would have appeared in Byng's fleet whether it approched with a slanting course, or in the conventional line-abreast way.

But That Was Not The Worst

The British fleet, having run down, would turn west-north-west in order to comply with the rules of tactics, to be able to challenge the enemy. It would find itself in reversed order, with its rearmost ship leading.

The captain of that ship, who was expecting this, had been waiting for the order to close, and with considerable inpatience had seen what he considered the right moment pass with no signal given: for he was, expecting the usual signal, to bear down when his ship was opposite the first of the enemy.

The result, when the long-expected order did come, he was round in a flash, and, dashing back the way he had come. Crowded on all sail in order to get at the eneny ship, without delay. Then when opposite it, he swung round to starboard, and went into the battle in the usual style.

The fleet which had twelve warships in the line, was divided into two squadrons, and all six ships of the rear squadron, under Temple West, did the same. But Byng, not unnaturally obeying his own orders, continued a slanting course towards the enemy with his own six ships.

The Manoeuvre Was Badly Executed

West's first five ships arrived in action easily first, and attacked furiously; so furiously that all the French ships opposite flinched, and fell to leeward on to a new line. West's other ship sailed in the wrong direction.

This though West and Byng didn't realise was quite intentional. It was a natural concerted move on their part, designed to take maximum advantage to slip away. They knew five lesser ships would not dare take twelve more powerful French ships.

Another effect of the two halves of the British Fleet approching using different systems was to cause a gap to appear between the two squadrons. And this gap was widened by the third misadventure of the unfortunate day.

The last of West's ships, bearing down on the enemy, had, owing to the initial lack of understanding between the squadrons, to go a long way on that vulnerable and slanting course already mentioned; and as so often happens in these circumstances, she was disabled, swinging round out of control into the path of bing's own squadron as it was going into action.

This misfortune brought Byng's line up with a jerk and threw it into confusion, serving greatly to increase the gap between the two squadrons.

The Admiral Was Extremely Unhappy

As the Admiral watched his plan going wrong; there was no way of telling what the French were thinking. Since the whole of his initial move was unorthodox, there naturally existed no orthodox signal to correct the mistake.

The only one he could use was that of ordering the leading ship to lead more to starboard. The idea was that that ship, would turn one point for every one gun fired by the Admiral as he made the signal.

And Byng fired only one gun. On the grounds he did not know, from the distance, exactly how the ship lay in relation to the enemy. Could he have given the right number of guns he might have kept West's squadron on a slanting course and so save his plan. But he failed; the leading ship obeyed but it was not enough.

Trying To Rectify The Error

Byng hoisted "Red at the Fore-topmast" for "Battle" to commence; when West's stray ship ploughed into Byng's leading ship in his squadron. Everything that could, appeared to be going wrong!

Then he did something, and that smartly and well, de la Galissoniere, seeing the gap before him, made for it to cut through and separate the English, and Byng, by exemplary seamanship, also tried to push into the space and twart him.

Thereupon the Frenchman fell back into the new line formed by his fleet, and the British being unable to follow, the fight ended. Byng and his squadron had barely been engaged in battle, but West's was, and they were pretty cut up.

Some are aware they shot Admiral John Byng

But they did not shoot him for the events above, although that is what they said. He made a mistake later which was ten times more serious.

He returned to Gibraltar, leaving Minorca to its fate. That was a strategical mistake, and the court martial which sat upon him was not empowered to condem him for it, since it was not a step taken in the face of the enemy.

They could only try him for his conduct of, and during the battle. On the charge of cowardice they acquitted him, but on the charge of negligence they condemned him.

Modern-day Pages Fast Boats Pages Joe Wezley Pages

Unfortunately 7 years previously

At one time a man convicted of negligence might have escaped without having the death sentence passed on him. But in 1749, all alternatives other than death had been excluded for those found guilty of the offence.

So they had no option other that to condemn him to death.

This is not to say that he to be executed, for with the Crown lay the choice of mercy. But the Crown would not use it, for reasons, why, no one knows, which we may dismiss as "political."

None the less that tactical System he was attempting can be by no means be acquitted of all the blame. Had Byng's plan been carried out how he intended, he might well have won his battle; in which case he would not have made the strategic blunder that cost him his life.

The continuation of this Naval History will be: "Continental Wars "

John Byng Continental Wars

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