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Richard Howe

1794, Was His Most Successful Year

This Naval History continues on from: "Sir George Rooke"

No British naval Officer can have seen longer and more varied service than Richard Howe. He entered the Navy just in time to start with Anson round the world in 1740, though his ship the "Pearl", got no further than the Horn.

He served if five major wars. He was made a Captain in 1746, the year which witnessed Prince Charlie's defeat at Culloden: his name was already a household word in England during the Seven Years War: he held high commands in the War of American Independence, and in the Revolutionary War the highest.

His share in the introduction of signals had already been noticed. His reputation as a tactician was world-wide and well desreved. It was only right that to him should fall the lot showing what the newly constituted Service could do.

Sir George Rooke

He Tried To Stop The Corn-Ships

His opportunity came when he followed the French fleet under Admiral Villaret Joyeuse out into the waters of the Atlantic in May 1794, and, in a series of manoeuvres almost classic, put the British fleet through its paces and the French fleet into a disorderly retreat.

Yet, at risk of looking a gift horse in the mouth, it must be admitted that he was far from being decisively successful in the end. Tactically, through weariness born of age and long-drawn-out watching, he failed to some extent to clinch his triumph.

Strategically he failed altogether, he was out to prevent the American corn-ships from reaching France, but they reached it in spite of his victory.

His First Tactical Success Was

On May 29th, he deliberately did what, twelve years before, Rodney had done without premeditation: he "divided the enemy's fleet from to leeward," cutting off the last five ships of the French line.

Admiral Joyeuse, equally able of handling his fleet, partly saved the situation, but he lost two ships to Howe and three more who were damaged, strayed to protect themselves from more destruction: and perhaps worse for him, he lost the wind and so enabled the British to bring him to battle.

His Next Success Was

On the first of June itself, Howe deliberately put into operation a completely new manoeuvre, thought out before hand in its details and implications. He proposed to "divide the enemy, at all points, from to windward."

The feat from the point of view of seamanship was remarkably difficult to perform, and only about one ship in four accomplished it. But that was not the fault of the new system or the new signals: all that side of this remarkable encounter went with clock-work precision.

The whole affair was, something of a triumph for the new Melee school, which aimed at the condition as its climax. The "approach" on this occasion was a highly controlled operation, and a very ambitious one.

Once he had gained the wind, and, thereby, the advantage of opening the action more or less when he desired, Howe's idealized plan was to sail through the enemy's fleet at all points and fetch up on the leeward side of the French ships, there to prevent the enemy from retreating.

Looking to Breach the French Line

He did not think it was possible, on the grounds of seamanship alone, for all his ships to get through, but he did estimate that he would take or destroy just as many ships as there were breaches in the line.

In this he was correct, for seven British ships came through or round the French line, and seven ships were lost; six captured and one was sunk.

This manoeuvre against the old line principle proved; the line is not only to be broken deliberately; it is to be broken at the maximum number of points.

Fighting Broke into Violent Action

Howe's scheme brought on the Lelee with a vengence. The fighting was quite exceptionally close and desperate. Ships collided with each other, or ground into one-an-other's sides.

Ships side-by-side in some cases, so close was the range that the guns could not be run out, and in one the port lids could not be raised, because they fouled the enemy ship's side, and had to be blown off by the discharge of the guns within.

All this was ideal of course, for the short-ranged but heavy-shotted carronades, and the new speed of loading and firing of the British pieces stood us in excellent stead.

The French losses in life were heavier, and their loss of ships were far heavier than ours was.

"Brunswick's" Famous Duel with "Vengeur du Peuple"

The "Brunswick," in her famous duel with the "Vengeur du Peuple" damaged the French ship so badly. That after a tremendous fight she surrendered, a total wreck, and went down soon afterwards.

The "Vengeur du Peuple" did not as the popular French version states; sank with all colours flying.

The French Evaded Tactical Action

If we compare this opening action of a great war with those of their predecessors we shall at once get the measure of the revolution that took place. And in another respect this famous fight was filled with good things to come.

It showed that at long last the British had achieved a system of tactics which was not only suitable to our normal strategy but also capable of nullifing the tactical systems of our enemies.

We have seen how, for so long, our almost uniformly offensive strategy had hesitated to accept a new idea or undertaking, by our would-be offensive set of tactics which had proved not to be offensive at all.

And how well, during this period, the French tactics of evasion had fitted their avoiding action strategy; and with what ease they evaded fighting altogether if they had had the wind, and if they had not how simple it was for them to break off before it came to a clinch.

But Now All is Suddenly Changed

The British have now decided that, after all, we must come to the ultimate offensive dicision of entering into the melee: and we have discovered how to do it.

The Spanish had been using properly trained soldiers, Spanish Marines, for hundreds of years, for board and entry into the enemy's ships. Now the Royal Navy had their own trained sea soldiers, the Marines, who could do their board and entry for them, man some of the cannons and carry out a number of other essential duties aboard ship.

And if the enemy has the wind and shyly persists in refusing to bear down on us, we have discovered that we can compel him into action: we can make up to him from the leeward, and, breaking through, do one or two things: either defeat him then and there, or having gained the wind as a result, force him to accept battle at our leisure.

Modern-day Pages Fast Boats Pages Joe Wezley Pages

With Better Ships Better Guns And Better Men

Oozing confidence, having gained the important offensive advantage which pocession of the wind granted, Howe proceeded to break through again, this time from the windward side, and at as many points as was possible, in order to deprive the enemy of the great advantage possessed by leeward fleets; the power of evasion before that decision was reached.

Howe showed them that no longer could they either avoid action or hope to break off from it at their pleasure. He gave them Hobson's choice. they must stand and fight, whatever their strategic preferences or special liking.

It was a tremendous tactical achievement, with obvious important strategical repercussions.

The continuation of this Naval History will be: "Sir John Jervis"

Richard Howe

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