Trajectories

Caused modern problems

the continuation of this Naval History carries on from: "Submarines"

On the afternoon of the 31st of May 1916, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty is said to have addressed his Flag-Captain; "chatfield, there seems to be something the matter with our bloody ships!"

It was an understatement. The Battle of Jutland had just begun; the battle cruisers "Indeflatigable" and "Queen Mary" had just gone up in a dull cloud of fire and smoke, dissapearing from view, and his own "Lion" had barely been saved from a like fate by a dying Royl Marine Officer. Someting was the matter. "We had got to pay for the unknown'-and we paid!"

What was wrong was this. When ships were first being armoured the range of guns was such that their shells would follow a not very high trajectory, and therefore, if we scored a hit, would tend to strike the side of the ship aimed at. So the heaviest armour had been placed there.

The day had now come when, with the longer range, the gun trajectories were more like those of howitzers, and the shells, on arrival, were falling much more vertically; so much so that, while missing the ship's side, they might plunge down direct upon her deck.

Not only, had more extensive and thicker deck armour become necessary, in order to prevent plunging shells from penetrating into the ship's vitals; especially the magazines or the vertical ammunition hoists up which the dangerous loads passed to the turrets; but another peril, not yet fully realized, had made its appearance.

Even if a shell failed to penetrate into a ship, a hit on a turret might cause a very dangerous cordite flash from our own ammunition about to pass down the hoists. This, there seems but little doubt, was the calamity which befell the two unhappy battle cruisers.

And, but for the qickness in thinking and courage of Major Harvey Royal Marines Light Infantry, the same would have happened to "H.M.S. Lion." Though seriously wounded, he ordered, all the hatches and doors of the guns to be remained closed when not being used in action.

It was not a "difficult flaw" to remedy, once the problem had been recognized, and flash-proof devices in the ammunitions supply arrangements were soon fitted in all of our ships.

But it cost us two fine units, 114 officers and 2,169 men; and many more, without those killed or injured on the "Lion," for later that day the "Invincible," the most respected of battle cruisers, came to an end so similar that the same cause is probable.

Submarines

The enemy's ships wouldn't sink

Another factor that closely concerns ship-construction policy was illustrated in this battle. The enemy's ships seemed to be able to take a great deal more punnishment than ours could and remain afloat, even when almost reduced to wrecks.

Their "Lutzow" was struck by at least 40 projectiles, and, though they failed to get her home because she could no longer steam, she was finally sunk by a German torpedo, not by British guns.

The "Derffinger" was hit 29 times and the "Seydlitz" 27 and also torpedoed; and both made it home-just. All three, it must be noted, were battle cruisers, and not intended to take such punishment as the Battleships.

It was true. The German ships were far harder to sink than ours. But this time there was much more behind it than a defect in flash-proof arrangements. A broad strategic issue was involved. The fact was the Germans and British were building and designing their ships for very different purposes.

The Germans made a maximum degree of unsinkability their principal aim. The ship's themselves were not likely to be called upon to serve very far away from their bases, or to undertake long and arduous voyages upon the oceans of the world.

Therefore, it was not necessary, or so it seemed to the Germans, to make them habitable for any lengthy period; the crew could live normally in barracks ashore and spend only a mere fraction of their time afloat.

It was a reasonable view to take, and it enabled the enemy constructors to design and build ships that were split up into a large number of permanent watertight compartments, each divided from its neighbour by a strong bulkhead which never was, and could not be, opened. In this way it was possible for a ship to take an enormous amount of punishment, and to have a large number of her compartments flooded, without foundering.

Different reasons for different navies

But we, with our Empire commitments,could not possibly contemplate such a system. Our ships' companies must live on board and so be allowed at least a reasonable standard of comfort.

That is why, our ships were not so closely sub-divided, and the bulkheads, pierced more liberally with doors for access and convenience, though watertight, were naturally not so strong as those of the Germans, or capable of resisting the same pressure of water or shock of explosion.

That what we lost in material strength we gained in morale there can be no doubt, and on balance the advantages of our method probably outweighed its disadvantages. But this does not mean that the Germans were wrong; they were probably right too.

The truth is that, in the First World War, both went a little too far. Our ships might have been a little less vulnerable, even though a trifle less habitable; the Germans might well have gained, on the long view, had they made their ships habitable enough for the crews to dwell in them more often, even at the cost of some inner strength.

In World War II it was almost certainly true that the German capital ship was harder to destroy than ours was. Their boast that the "Bismarck" was unsinkable. though untrue, impressed many of our officers who witnessed her end as being unpleasantly near the truth.

It is also true that post-war revalations, that were released but long suspected, have gone far to show how the Nazis managed it. By dint of shameless lying in high places they built their ships of a much greater size than they admitted, and used the extra tonnage they obtained to add to their internal strength and protection.

There can be no doubt, that had our contractors resorted to the same sharp practice, they also could have made ships that were much harder to sink. But even after due allowance has been made for this, many people still consider that the German capital ships were, ton for ton, ahead of ours in this respect, and for the reasons given above, they were.

Here there has been little attempt, to grapple in detail with the modern Royal Navy. But though there is no answer to the query "What?" there is, we hope, some answer to the question "How?"

A serious attempt has been made to show how the warship developed from the old trading Round Ship of the North, and the story of its tortuous and multiple evolution has been followed, wherever possible, up to the moment when the modern warship, is seen emerging from the toils.

This may appear to be an ending to some exciting Naval History, but I can assure you, that, that is not the case. For, I too had my doubts, whether this experience could continue. Fighter and Seaman, however, he is-like the warship with which he grew-an English evolution, and his story coincides closely with that of the warship's story, and adds, immencely to our over-all picture.

Let us leave her now, and seek to discover how she was officered and how she was manned. This matter is of at least equal importance; for the ship, however good, is no good at all without a ship's company, and not much good without a good one.

The Continuation of this Naval History will be called: "Fighter And Seaman"

Trajectories Fighter and Seaman

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